IAEA inspector checking a security seal and monitoring systems in a civilian nuclear facility. © CS Media.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the international organization responsible for promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology and verifying that nuclear materials declared by states remain outside weapons programs. Established in 1957 and headquartered in Vienna, it occupies a singular position in the nuclear regime. This is because it acts at the same time as a technical agency, a diplomatic forum, and a verification mechanism.
This combination is necessary because nuclear technology is dual-use. On the one hand, nuclear science can be used to produce electricity, medical radioisotopes, agricultural techniques, and industrial applications. On the other hand, it can also be used to produce fissile material for nuclear explosives. For this reason, the IAEA’s work extends beyond energy. It also helps organize international trust in an area where technology, sovereignty, and security converge.
In this context, the political core of its work lies in nuclear safeguards. Through legal agreements, state declarations, technical monitoring, and inspections, the IAEA seeks to provide credible assurances that nuclear materials and facilities have not been diverted for military purposes. In this way, the system does not by itself eliminate the risk of proliferation. Even so, it raises the political and technical cost of concealment, creates international alerts, and provides information for diplomatic decisions.
Origin and Mandate
The IAEA was born from the attempt to separate, in institutional terms, peaceful uses of nuclear energy from the race for nuclear weapons. In December 1953, United States President Dwight Eisenhower delivered the speech known as “Atoms for Peace” at the United Nations General Assembly. The proposal was to create an international agency capable of encouraging civilian applications of atomic energy. At the same time, that agency was supposed to reduce the risk of the military spread of nuclear technology.
The context was the beginning of the Cold War. The United States had already used nuclear weapons in 1945. Subsequently, the Soviet Union tested its first bomb in 1949. After that, other countries began to seek capabilities of their own. In that environment, the central question was how to allow access to nuclear technology without opening the way to new arsenals.
The solution adopted, however, was not to create a supranational authority with direct control over all national nuclear programs. Instead, the IAEA was structured as an organization based on agreements, technical cooperation, and verification. Thus, the agency would depend on states’ adherence, but it would also create common procedures for inspecting materials and facilities subject to safeguards.
The IAEA Statute was approved in 1956 and entered into force in 1957. Its formal objective is to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity. In addition, the agency must ensure, within its competence, that the assistance it provides is not used for military purposes. This formulation already indicates a permanent tension: the IAEA facilitates the expansion of peaceful nuclear uses, but it must verify that those uses remain peaceful.
The agency is independent, but it maintains an institutional relationship with the United Nations system. It reports to the UN General Assembly and, when necessary, can refer situations involving non-compliance with safeguards obligations to the Security Council. It can also communicate issues related to international peace and security. In this sense, the IAEA produces technical information. The harsher political consequences, however, depend on states and the competent political bodies.
Institutional Structure
The IAEA’s structure combines broad participation, permanent executive direction, and a Board of Governors with concentrated decision-making weight. The General Conference brings together all member states and functions as the broadest political organ. It approves the budget, elects members to the Board of Governors, and discusses general priorities. In addition, it gives diplomatic visibility to disputes over nuclear energy, security, and non-proliferation.
The Board of Governors has 35 members. It plays a central role because it approves safeguards agreements, examines Secretariat reports, and deliberates on cases of non-compliance. When necessary, it also refers certain issues to the UN. Its composition seeks to combine countries with significant nuclear capability and geographic distribution. In practice, however, the Board also reflects political disputes among nuclear powers, developing countries, states allied with major powers, and countries under investigation.
The Secretariat carries out the day-to-day work. It is headed by the Director General and brings together specialists in safeguards, nuclear safety, energy, science, technical cooperation, law, and administration. The Director General has an important political role because the office communicates technical conclusions, negotiates access with governments, and presents reports to the Board. However, that authority depends on the mandates approved by states. It also depends on the legal agreements that authorize verification activities.
This architecture produces a difficult combination. First, the IAEA needs to preserve technical credibility before states that expect evidence-based decisions. Second, it operates in a diplomatic environment marked by proliferation allegations, sanctions, and regional rivalries. Consequently, its reports may be technical in form, but they almost always have political effects.
Functions Beyond Inspections
The IAEA is not only an inspection agency: it also supports the international infrastructure for peaceful uses, nuclear safety, and nuclear security. A relevant part of its work involves technical cooperation with countries that use nuclear technology in medicine, agriculture, research, industry, water management, pest control, and electricity production. In this area, the agency helps disseminate knowledge and standards and supports capacity-building.
In the area of nuclear energy, the IAEA offers support to countries that operate or plan to operate nuclear power plants. This support may involve energy planning, training regulators, infrastructure assessment, radioactive waste management, and the strengthening of national capacities. However, the decision to build a power plant remains national. For this reason, the agency does not choose states’ energy mixes.
Nuclear safety concerns the prevention of accidents. It involves the safe operation of reactors, facilities, radioactive materials, and waste. In this field, the IAEA develops standards, organizes peer-review missions, and promotes the exchange of experience after accidents or incidents. Even so, primary responsibility for nuclear safety remains with the state and with facility operators.
Nuclear security has a different focus. It concerns preventing, detecting, and responding to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, and malicious acts involving nuclear or radioactive materials. In this field, the IAEA helps develop guidance, training, and cooperation. However, as with nuclear safety, it does not replace national security authorities.
Safeguards form the dimension most directly linked to non-proliferation. They do not verify whether a power plant is efficient. Nor do they assess, by themselves, whether a country’s energy policy is adequate. In addition, they do not guarantee that a facility is protected against all physical risks. Their specific objective is to verify whether nuclear materials subject to agreements remain in peaceful uses.
Safeguards and Relationship with the NPT
Safeguards are the technical link between states’ right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the obligation not to divert nuclear materials to weapons. In the contemporary nuclear non-proliferation regime, this link is especially associated with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The treaty was opened for signature in 1968, entered into force in 1970, and was extended indefinitely in 1995.
The NPT separates states into two legal categories. On one side are the five states recognized by the treaty as nuclear-weapon states: China, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Russia. On the other side are the non-nuclear-weapon states, which assume the obligation not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. In return, the treaty recognizes the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It also includes a commitment to move toward disarmament.
The IAEA is not a party to the NPT. Even so, it received an essential role in verifying the obligations of non-nuclear-weapon states. These states must conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the agency. In this way, all nuclear material in their territory, jurisdiction, or control becomes subject to verification. In practical terms, therefore, the IAEA became the main international mechanism for the technical oversight of the non-proliferation regime.
Safeguards agreements vary according to the state’s legal position. The main types are:
- Comprehensive safeguards agreements, applied to non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the NPT or to nuclear-weapon-free zones.
- Voluntary offer agreements, concluded with the five states recognized as possessing nuclear weapons by the NPT.
- Item-specific safeguards agreements, applied to certain materials, facilities, or activities in states that are not parties to the NPT, such as India, Pakistan, and Israel.
This distinction is important because the IAEA does not operate with a single model for all countries. The extent of verification depends on the applicable agreement, the state’s legal category, and the obligations accepted. For this reason, a safeguards conclusion must always be read within the legal mandate available to the agency.
How Nuclear Inspections Work
An IAEA inspection begins before inspectors arrive, because it depends on declarations, information analysis, and technical planning. States subject to safeguards must declare nuclear materials, relevant facilities, and activities covered by the agreement. The agency then analyzes those declarations and defines how to verify them.
Verification involves nuclear material accountancy, on-site inspections, measurements, sampling, seals, cameras, containment, and remote surveillance. It also involves comparison between declared data and independent evidence. The objective, however, is not to track every atom in real time. More precisely, it is to maintain a chain of information robust enough to detect significant diversions in a timely manner.
In a nuclear facility, inspectors may verify inventories, check records, and measure quantities of material. They may also examine equipment and install surveillance devices. In addition, in certain circumstances, they may collect environmental samples. This type of sampling makes it possible to identify traces of nuclear material that could indicate undeclared activities. This remains relevant even when equipment has been removed or when the facility has been cleaned.
The IAEA organizes this work in an annual cycle. First, it collects and assesses information. Then, it develops a safeguards approach for each state and each relevant facility. After that, it conducts verification activities in the field and at headquarters. Finally, it assesses the results and publishes safeguards conclusions.
These conclusions have different scopes. When a state has a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol in force, the IAEA has a broader basis for assessing the nuclear program as a whole. In that situation, it can conclude that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. When the mandate is more restricted, the conclusion tends to cover only declared nuclear material. This difference is decisive, because verifying declared material does not, by itself, amount to confirming the absence of any undeclared activity.
The scale of the system is broad. In 2024, the IAEA applied safeguards in 190 states with agreements in force. In the same year, it carried out more than 3,000 in-field verification activities at more than 1,300 nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities. These figures show that the regime functions as a permanent infrastructure of technical oversight. Therefore, it is not merely an exceptional response to nuclear crises.
The Additional Protocol and Its Non-Universality
The Additional Protocol expanded the IAEA’s ability to look for indications of undeclared nuclear material and activities, but it did not become a universal obligation. The experience of Iraq in the early 1990s showed an important flaw. Traditional safeguards agreements were stronger for verifying declared material than for detecting clandestine programs. The crisis involving North Korea reinforced the same concern. Without sufficient access and without cooperation, the agency would have difficulty forming a complete view of a state’s nuclear program.
The institutional response was the Model Additional Protocol, approved in 1997. The Additional Protocol does not replace the safeguards agreement. It complements it. Its objective is to give the IAEA more information, more avenues for access, and more verification instruments. To this end, it covers data on parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, research and development activities, the manufacture of sensitive equipment, mines, uranium concentration plants, and relevant exports and imports.
With the Additional Protocol, the IAEA may also conduct complementary access at specific locations. This prerogative does not mean unrestricted freedom to enter any place, at any time, and without a legal basis. More precisely, it means that the state has accepted an additional set of obligations. As a consequence, the agency gains more ability to clarify doubts and confirm the consistency of national declarations.
The adoption of the Additional Protocol, however, is not universal. On December 31, 2025, it was in force for 144 states and Euratom. Many countries see the instrument as a normal step in strengthening non-proliferation. Others, however, treat it as an additional and voluntary obligation. This is because the NPT requires comprehensive safeguards agreements from non-nuclear-weapon states, but does not make the Additional Protocol a universal condition for participation in the treaty.
Resistance to the Additional Protocol has several political reasons. First, some governments state that more intrusive inspections may expose industrial, scientific, or strategic secrets. This concern appears especially when the country masters sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Second, there are states that already participate in regional or bilateral mechanisms for nuclear material accounting and control. For this reason, they argue that their transparency does not depend only on the Additional Protocol. Third, countries without nuclear weapons often link the issue to the slow pace of nuclear disarmament by the powers recognized by the NPT.
The Brazilian debate illustrates this logic without changing the system’s general rule. Brazil maintains that the peaceful character of its nuclear program is protected by constitutional rules, the NPT, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the Quadripartite Agreement signed by Brazil, Argentina, ABACC, and the IAEA. In addition, Brazilian diplomacy usually treats the Additional Protocol as an optional obligation, not as an automatic requirement for proving nuclear good faith. According to this reading, demanding additional commitments from countries without nuclear weapons, without proportional progress in disarmament by nuclear-weapon states, would reinforce an asymmetry already present in the regime.
The non-universality of the Additional Protocol, therefore, does not arise only from suspicions about clandestine programs. It also expresses a dispute over the balance of obligations, technological protection, and the distribution of costs in the non-proliferation regime. Even so, from the IAEA’s technical point of view, the absence of the Additional Protocol limits the ability to offer broader assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
Crises That Tested Nuclear Verification
The most sensitive cases show that the IAEA produces technical information, but does not control states’ strategic behavior by itself. The Iraqi experience after the Gulf War exposed the difficulty of detecting a clandestine nuclear program using only instruments focused on declared material. As a result, the episode became one of the central reasons for strengthening the system through the Additional Protocol.
North Korea illustrates a harder limit. When a state restricts or ends cooperation, the IAEA loses direct access to facilities and materials. The agency can continue monitoring external indicators, assessing available information, and producing reports. However, its capacity for verification in the field depends on physical presence, installed instruments, records, and minimal cooperation. Without these elements, oversight becomes incomplete.
Iran shows another type of tension. In this case, the IAEA remains at the center of a dispute that combines technical verification, sanctions, diplomatic negotiations, and regional rivalry. The agency can measure stockpiles, verify enrichment levels, report lack of access, and identify inconsistencies. However, the decision on sanctions, political agreements, or coercive responses belongs to states and, in certain circumstances, to the UN Security Council.
Ukraine added a distinct dimension to the recent nuclear debate. The presence of armed conflict around nuclear facilities, such as the Zaporizhzhia plant, raised nuclear safety and security concerns. In this case, the central problem is not only proliferation. Rather, the crisis shows that the IAEA is also called to act when war threatens the safe operation of civilian facilities. Even so, the resolution of the conflict remains outside its competence.
These examples delimit the agency’s reach. The IAEA can detect, document, verify, warn, and inform. It has no force of its own to impose access, dismantle programs, or apply sanctions. Consequently, its political power arises from the credibility of its conclusions. It also depends on the willingness of states to turn those conclusions into diplomatic pressure.
Political and Institutional Limits
The IAEA’s main limitation is that technical verification depends on legal authority, physical access, and political cooperation. The agency can apply safeguards only according to the agreements accepted by states. If the agreement is narrow, verification will be narrow. If the state does not accept the Additional Protocol, the agency will have fewer instruments to investigate undeclared activities. If the state blocks access or stops cooperating, the agency can record the difficulty. However, it cannot resolve the impasse by itself.
Another limit lies in enforcing consequences. The IAEA can report non-compliance to its Board of Governors. In cases relevant to peace and security, it can also bring issues to the UN Security Council. However, sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and coercive responses depend on political decisions. For this reason, two technically similar cases may receive different political treatment. The difference may stem from alliances, regional rivalries, and the interests of major powers.
There is also a conceptual limit. Safeguards are not disarmament. They seek to prevent or detect diversions of nuclear material to weapons, especially in states that have assumed non-proliferation obligations. However, they do not eliminate the existing arsenals of states that already have nuclear weapons. Nor do they resolve the criticism that the NPT consolidated a hierarchy between nuclear-weapon states and countries barred from obtaining them.
In addition, nuclear technology retains zones of ambiguity. Uranium enrichment may have a civilian purpose, but it can also reduce the time needed for a possible military option. The same applies to the reprocessing of spent fuel and to certain forms of advanced research. For this reason, the IAEA works in a space in which the same activity can be legal, sensitive, and politically suspect at the same time.
This ambiguity explains why the agency is often pressured from opposite sides. Some states want more intrusive inspections and harsher conclusions. Others accuse the IAEA of exceeding technical mandates or reflecting the priorities of more powerful countries. The agency’s credibility therefore depends on resisting these pressures. At the same time, it depends on not ignoring technical evidence or minimizing real risks.
Conclusion
The IAEA is a central element of nuclear governance because it connects three dimensions that are difficult to separate: technological development, international security, and diplomatic trust. Its function is not to prevent every sensitive nuclear use. Nor is it to replace national decisions. Its function is to create a verification system that makes it harder to turn civilian programs into military programs without detection.
The agency works best when there are broad agreements, state cooperation, technical access, and political willingness to take its conclusions seriously. By contrast, it works worse when states restrict access, when the legal mandate is limited, or when geopolitical disputes turn technical evidence into an object of diplomatic obstruction. In this way, the IAEA does not solve the nuclear problem by itself. Even so, it organizes an essential part of the international response to it.
Its role remains relevant because nuclear technology continues to be necessary for several areas of public policy. At the same time, that technology remains sensitive from an international security standpoint. As long as this duality exists, safeguards, inspections, and independent verification will remain central instruments for distinguishing legitimate nuclear cooperation from proliferation risk.