Migration in Latin America and the Caribbean: Trends and Statistics

Migration in Latin America and the Caribbean is no longer only a story of people leaving for the United States. That route remains the largest one. Yet the region now hosts millions of migrants from neighbouring countries, receives and sends large remittance flows, manages humanitarian displacement, and serves as a transit space for people trying to reach North America. The result is a regional migration system in which the same country may be a place of origin, destination, transit and return at the same time.

The latest World Migration Report 2026, published by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), uses the 2024 edition of the UN migrant-stock data. That point is important for interpretation: the figures describe where foreign-born people were living at a given moment, not how many people crossed a border during that year. Route data, asylum figures, displacement estimates and remittance statistics measure different parts of the same process.

At the global level, IOM reports that there were about 304 million international migrants by mid-2024, or 3.7 per cent of the world’s population. Latin America and the Caribbean accounts for only part of that total, but the region is central to some of the world’s largest corridors. The Mexico-United States corridor remains the largest country-to-country migration corridor in the world. Venezuelan displacement has turned South America into one of the main theatres of cross-border protection and regularization policy.

Regional Pattern

The strongest long-term pattern is movement from Latin America and the Caribbean to Northern America. According to the WMR 2026 chapter on regional dimensions, more than 27 million people born in Latin America and the Caribbean were living in Northern America in 2024. In 1990, the equivalent number was just under 10 million. The change reflects several mechanisms working together. Labour demand and family reunification created stable routes; violence, economic crises and geographic proximity kept movement politically visible.

Europe is the second major external destination. In 2024, about 6 million people born in Latin America and the Caribbean were living in Europe, up from nearly 5 million in 2020. Spain receives many migrants from the region because language, citizenship rules and family ties lower some barriers to settlement. Portugal, Italy and other European countries receive migrants from the region as well, but Europe remains smaller than Northern America as a destination.

Intraregional migration has become one of the main changes since 2020. Around 14 million migrants living in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2024 had been born in another country within the same region. The comparable number was just under 11 million in 2020. Venezuelan displacement explains much of that increase, but it is not the whole story. Haitians, Cubans and Nicaraguans move within the region; Colombians, Ecuadorians and Central Americans appear in labour routes, asylum systems and northbound transit flows.

The region also receives migrants from outside Latin America and the Caribbean, though at a smaller scale. WMR 2026 estimates that the total number of migrants from other regions living there has remained close to 3 million over the last 35 years. In 2024, roughly 1.2 million were born in Europe and 1.3 million in Northern America. Some are retirees, investors, professionals or return migrants with foreign-born children; others are people moving for work, study or family reasons.

These numbers show why a single label such as “emigration region” is too narrow. Mexico, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia and Honduras remain major countries of origin for communities in the United States. At the same time, several countries host significant migrant populations. Colombia and Peru are the largest hosts. Chile, Brazil and Ecuador receive major flows, as do Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Mexico and Costa Rica. The political problem is that migration institutions often developed when governments expected smaller and more predictable flows.

The Main Corridors

The Mexico-United States corridor dominates the map. WMR 2026 estimates that around 11 million Mexican-born people were living in the United States in 2024. That number is lower than the peak of almost 12 million in 2015, but it is still larger than any other country-to-country migration corridor. It reflects a long history of agricultural work, industrial labour, border communities, family ties and uneven economic opportunity between neighbouring countries.

Other major corridors lead to the United States. People born in El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Cuba form large communities there. So do people born in Guatemala, Colombia and Honduras. Each corridor has a different history. Cuban migration was shaped by the Cuban Revolution, later economic hardship and special U.S. policies. Salvadoran, Guatemalan and Honduran migration has been linked to civil conflict and insecurity. Hurricanes, weak labour markets and family networks shaped movement north as well. Dominican migration combines economic opportunity, urban networks and long-standing links with New York and other U.S. cities.

The two major corridors outside the United States are Venezuelan: Venezuela-Colombia and Venezuela-Peru. Their presence among the largest regional corridors marks the scale of the Venezuelan crisis. In practical terms, this means that migration policy in Latin America is no longer only about consular visas and border posts. It reaches school enrolment and health systems. Work permits, identity documents and municipal budgets decide whether displaced people can live legally and support themselves.

Corridor data should not be read as annual flow data. A corridor is an accumulated stock of people born in one country and residing in another. If 11 million Mexican-born people live in the United States, that figure includes people who arrived decades ago, recent arrivals, naturalized citizens and many different legal statuses. For that reason, migrant-stock data are useful for showing the size of communities; border data are better for understanding short-term pressure on transit routes.

Venezuelan Displacement

The Venezuelan crisis is the largest displacement process in the modern history of Latin America and the Caribbean. WMR 2026 states that about 7.9 million Venezuelans had left the country by November 2024. Around 85 per cent went to another Latin American or Caribbean country. That distribution distinguishes the Venezuelan case from migration patterns that move primarily toward the United States or Europe.

The main host countries are nearby or regionally accessible. Colombia received about 2.8 million Venezuelans; Peru received about 1.6 million. Brazil, Chile and Ecuador host large Venezuelan populations as well. The latest IOM report gives slightly different country counts depending on the statistical category being used. Some Venezuelans are counted as refugees or asylum seekers. Others are counted as people in need of international protection, or as migrants with regular or temporary status.

The legal response has been unusually large by regional standards. Colombia introduced a Temporary Protection Status programme in 2021, giving eligible Venezuelans a path to ten-year residency. Peru launched a Temporary Stay Permit in 2023 for Venezuelans with irregular status. Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru used flexible documentation rules at different moments, including acceptance of expired passports or identity cards. These measures did not eliminate irregularity, but they gave many people a way to work, enrol children in school and use public services.

R4V, the regional platform co-led by IOM and UNHCR, shows why legal status is only part of the issue. Its Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for 2025-2026 says that host governments provided documentation or refugee recognition to Venezuelan refugees and migrants. Yet R4V also estimated that 4.18 million Venezuelans in destination countries still struggled to access essential services, protection and socioeconomic integration across the 17 countries covered by the response.

The Venezuelan case shows the effect of visa restrictions. WMR 2026 notes that many countries initially allowed Venezuelans to enter without visas, but most later introduced visa requirements. These measures reduced some regular entries and pushed people toward irregular routes and more precarious status. Mexico’s 2022 visa requirement is one example: regular entries fell; irregular movement later surpassed regular arrivals.

Central America, Mexico and the Darién Route

Central America and Mexico sit between South America and the United States, so their migration politics combine origin, transit, destination and enforcement pressures. People from Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua continue to move because of insecurity, low wages, family networks, weak public services and climate-related shocks. At the same time, people from Venezuela, Haiti, Cuba and Ecuador have used the region as a route north. So have some migrants from outside the Americas.

The Darién Gap, between Colombia and Panama, became the clearest symbol of this route system. The route is a jungle crossing shaped by rivers, mud and limited rescue capacity. Criminal groups, sexual violence and extortion make the journey more dangerous. For many migrants, crossing the Darién meant that legal air travel, visa access or safer land routes had already been closed or made too expensive.

Route data changed sharply after 2024. IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix reported that, in the May-August 2025 edition of its global route overview, irregular transits through Panama’s Darién region had declined by 99 per cent compared with 2024. It found that 92 per cent of flows were heading south toward Central and South America, not north. That reversal followed stronger enforcement and changing U.S. policy. Panamanian measures, exhausted savings and failed asylum expectations pushed some people to abandon the northbound route as well.

The fall in Darién crossings shows how quickly enforcement and political signals can redirect movement. Routes can close, reverse or become less visible even while the pressures behind migration remain. Some people return south. Others remain in Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama or Colombia. Some wait for appointments, regularization options or work. Others choose more hidden routes, which usually gives smugglers and criminal groups more control over movement.

For governments, the route problem is administrative as much as humanitarian. Transit countries need shelters, registration systems, health services, child protection and police capacity. Destination countries want to control entry and asylum access. Origin countries face the social effects of emigration and return. No single government controls the entire route, which is why enforcement in one country often shifts pressure to another.

Caribbean Mobility

The Caribbean has its own migration logic. Some Caribbean countries have high emigration rates because small labour markets cannot absorb all workers, especially in specialized professions. The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France and Spain all have Caribbean communities shaped by colonial history, language, tourism, education and service-sector employment. Remittances help many households, but emigration can also reduce the supply of nurses, teachers and other trained workers.

The Caribbean is a destination and transit area as well. In island states, migration policy often has to manage labour shortages, diaspora links and sudden humanitarian arrivals at the same time. Venezuelan displacement reached Trinidad and Tobago, Aruba, Curaçao, the Dominican Republic and Guyana, among others. Haiti’s crisis has added another layer. Gang violence, political instability and economic collapse have displaced Haitians internally and abroad, while the Dominican Republic has tightened enforcement and deportations. Cuba has seen large outward movement, especially toward the United States and through third countries.

Regional mobility arrangements matter, but they do not remove every barrier. CARICOM rules allow some categories of skilled nationals to move and work within parts of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy. In practice, implementation varies by country, occupational category and documentation. This creates a gap between formal regional mobility and the reality faced by lower-income workers, asylum seekers and people without complete papers.

Environmental risk is a constant part of Caribbean mobility. Hurricanes, floods, coastal erosion and infrastructure damage can trigger temporary displacement, longer-term relocation or renewed emigration. In small island states, a single storm can damage housing and tourism revenue at the same time. Schools, hospitals and public debt then become part of the mobility problem. Migration then becomes one household strategy among several: a family may send one member abroad, rely on remittances to rebuild, or move internally away from exposed areas.

Remittances and Development

Remittances connect migration to everyday economic life. WMR 2026 reports that global remittances were expected to reach USD 905 billion in 2024, including USD 685 billion to low- and middle-income countries. Mexico was the second-largest remittance recipient in the world in 2024, with USD 67.64 billion. Guatemala was also among the ten largest recipients, with USD 21.64 billion.

These flows do concrete work for households. They pay for food and rent, cover medicine, meet school expenses, repair homes and service debt. During disasters or economic downturns, remittances can arrive faster than public assistance. For some countries in Central America and the Caribbean, remittances are a major share of national income, which means that migration policy in the United States can affect household consumption far beyond U.S. territory.

Remittances reduce hardship for many families, but they do not replace public investment or stable employment at home. A household that receives dollars from abroad may improve its own housing or education prospects, while the local economy still lacks enough jobs, security or infrastructure. In addition, remittances depend on migrants’ wages and legal position abroad. Families in origin countries feel policy changes abroad quickly when migrants lose work, face deportation or move into informal channels.

Transfer costs remain a policy issue. The Sustainable Development Goals set a target of reducing the average cost of sending remittances to less than 3 per cent. WMR 2026 reports that costs have fallen in several regions but remain above that target. In 2023, average costs in Latin America and the Caribbean were around 5.9 per cent. For low-income households, that gap is not abstract: it is money that does not reach the family receiving the transfer.

Disasters, Violence and Internal Displacement

Migration statistics often focus on people who cross borders, but many people in the region move inside their own country first. Disasters produced some of the largest internal displacements in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2024. WMR 2026, using IDMC data, reports more than 1 million internal disaster displacements in Brazil, mostly connected to flooding in Rio Grande do Sul. Cuba recorded about 480,000 disaster displacements, largely after hurricanes Oscar and Rafael.

Conflict and criminal violence force movement inside national borders as well. Haiti recorded nearly 900,000 conflict-related displacements in 2024, and more than 1 million people were internally displaced there by the end of the year. Colombia recorded 388,000 internal conflict displacements, while Ecuador recorded more than 100,000. These cases show that displacement in the region is not only a matter of poverty or voluntary labour migration. Armed groups, territorial control, extortion and state weakness can force people to move even when they would prefer to stay.

Climate-related mobility is likely to become more visible, but it should be described carefully. A hurricane, drought or flood rarely acts alone. It affects migration when harvest losses, household debt, damaged housing and local job losses change what families can endure. Insurance, public services and perceptions of future risk shape who can stay and who moves. People with money may move before a disaster or rebuild afterward. People with fewer resources may be trapped in exposed areas or forced into riskier forms of movement.

Policy Choices

Latin America and the Caribbean has experimented with more regularization than many other regions. The Venezuelan response is the clearest example of large-scale regularization in the region. Other instruments include regional residence agreements, humanitarian visas and asylum channels. Border worker visas and limited free-movement arrangements also play a role. These instruments let governments identify people, collect data, give access to work, and reduce the power of smugglers over migrants who would otherwise remain irregular.

The limits are clear. Regularization programmes need administrative capacity, funding and political support. When documents expire, appointments are scarce, fees are high or employers discriminate, legal status on paper may not lead to stable inclusion. Local governments often carry the practical burden because migrants live in cities and border towns, not in national policy documents. Schools, clinics and labour inspectors need resources if regularization is to become more than registration.

Restrictive policies can produce short-term reductions in visible crossings, but they often shift movement elsewhere. Visa requirements, deportations and border closures may reduce one route and increase irregular entry, overstays, smuggling fees or return flows. States retain the right to regulate borders. Enforcement works better when paired with legal pathways, documentation systems and labour-market rules. Asylum capacity and cooperation with neighbouring countries decide whether pressure is shared or merely displaced.

The region’s migration system will remain mixed. Some people will move for work or study. Others will flee violence, disaster or political crisis. Some will return, circulate or settle permanently. The central policy question is how much of that movement happens through regular channels. Those channels need to identify people, authorize work, support taxation and connect migrants to basic services. When they are too narrow, migration does not stop; it becomes more expensive, less visible and more dangerous.