A boat carrying migrants from Samoa to Tokelau, New Zealand. Image by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, licensed under CC BY 4.0.
Oceania has a small population compared with other world regions, but migration occupies a large place in its demography. UN DESA’s 2024 migrant-stock data estimated about 9.9 million international migrants in Oceania, equal to roughly 21.5% of the region’s population. That share was higher than the shares for Europe and Northern America. The figure is dominated by Australia and New Zealand, but the regional story also includes Pacific island emigration, seasonal labor schemes, remittances and climate-related displacement.
Oceania has a high migrant share.
The latest World Migration Report 2026, published by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), uses the 2024 UN data to show why Oceania looks unusual in global migration statistics. At the global level, there were about 304 million international migrants by mid-2024, or 3.7% of the world’s population. Oceania’s absolute number is small, yet migrants make up a large share of the region because Australia and New Zealand have high foreign-born populations and many Pacific island states have small resident populations.
Australia is adjusting after the post-pandemic migration surge.
Oceania therefore has several migration systems operating at once. Australia and New Zealand are wealthy destination countries with universities, large service economies and formal immigration programs. Pacific island countries often appear on the other side of the relationship: their citizens move to larger economies for work, education, family reasons or safety after disasters. The region’s migration pattern links settlement in Australia and New Zealand with the economic survival of many smaller island communities.
New Zealand gains migrants while losing citizens.
Australia
Australia is the largest destination country in Oceania. UN DESA estimated that it hosted about 8.1 million international migrants in 2024, or roughly 30.4% of its population. This makes migration central to Australia’s labor market, population growth, universities and urban development. The largest origin groups include people born in the United Kingdom, India, China and New Zealand, alongside migrants from many other parts of Asia, Europe and the Pacific.
Migration is part of the income system in several Pacific economies.
Recent flow data show the post-pandemic adjustment. The Australian Bureau of Statistics reported net overseas migration of 446,000 people in the 2023-2024 financial year, down from the very high post-border-reopening level of the previous year. Later 2024-2025 data showed a further fall. Australia’s migration debate is now shaped by the gap between strong labor and education demand on one side and housing pressure on the other.
Worker protection belongs inside seasonal labor policy.
International students are central to that debate. Australian universities depend on foreign students for revenue, and many students see Australia as a pathway to work experience or longer-term residence. At the same time, rapid arrivals after the reopening of borders intensified concern about rental markets, infrastructure and the integrity of education-linked migration pathways. The policy issue is how to keep the value of international education aligned with labor and housing policy.
Migration and climate policy increasingly overlap.
Temporary workers also matter. Australia uses skilled visas, working holiday visas and Pacific labor schemes to meet workforce needs. Some migrants work in high-skilled sectors, while others fill jobs in agriculture, care, hospitality, construction and logistics. The risk is that temporary status can weaken bargaining power. When workers depend on a visa, an employer or a labor contractor, they may be less able to report abuse, wage theft or unsafe conditions.
New Zealand
New Zealand is smaller, but migration is also central to its population and economy. UN DESA estimated about 1.47 million international migrants in New Zealand in 2024, roughly 28.2% of the population. The country has long received migrants from the Pacific, the United Kingdom, Asia and Australia. It also has a large citizen outflow, especially to Australia, because New Zealanders have extensive mobility rights across the Tasman Sea.
Stats NZ reported a provisional net migration gain of 14,200 people in the December 2025 year, down from a gain of 23,800 in 2024 and far below the post-pandemic peak. The figures included a net gain of non-New Zealand citizens and a net loss of New Zealand citizens. That combination is important: New Zealand can receive migrants and lose many of its own citizens at the same time.
The New Zealand case shows why net migration needs interpretation. A positive net figure may hide large arrivals and large departures. If many citizens leave while non-citizens arrive, the labor market gains people but families and professional networks change. Some New Zealanders leave for higher wages in Australia. Some migrants arrive to work, study or join family. Migration in New Zealand is therefore both a source of population growth and a sign of the country’s wage gap with Australia.
New Zealand also plays a major role for Pacific mobility. Pacific communities are deeply embedded in New Zealand society, and many families maintain ties across Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau and other islands. Migration can support education, remittances and family networks, but it can also produce separation and care burdens when working-age adults spend long periods abroad.
Pacific Island Emigration
Pacific island countries have small populations, so even modest numbers of emigrants can represent a large share of a community. UN DESA’s 2024 data show high intraregional migration from Oceania: about 73% of migrants born in Oceania live elsewhere in the region. For many Pacific islanders, “migration abroad” means movement to Australia, New Zealand, Guam, American Samoa or other nearby destinations, rather than movement to Europe or the Middle East.
The reasons are practical. Larger economies offer more jobs, higher wages, universities, health services and family networks. Some islands have limited domestic labor markets, narrow export bases and high exposure to cyclones, droughts, sea-level rise and other hazards. Migration can therefore function as a household strategy. One family member works abroad, sends money home and helps relatives pay for food, school fees, housing or health care.
Remittances are especially important in Polynesia. World Bank material on remittances repeatedly places Tonga and Samoa among the most remittance-dependent economies in the world. In recent estimates, remittances to Tonga and Samoa represented very large shares of GDP. For some Pacific economies, migration is not only a demographic fact; it is part of the national income system.
This dependence has trade-offs. Remittances can stabilize households after disasters or economic shocks. They can also reduce poverty and finance education. However, heavy reliance on overseas workers exposes families to labor-market conditions in Australia, New Zealand and the United States. If migrants lose jobs, face exploitation or cannot travel, households at home lose income. The home country may also lose nurses, teachers, tradespeople and young adults who are needed locally.
Seasonal Labor Schemes
Australia and New Zealand operate formal labor-mobility schemes for Pacific workers. Australia’s Pacific Australia Labour Mobility scheme and New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme connect employers with workers from Pacific island countries. These programs are especially important in agriculture and horticulture, where seasonal demand is high and local labor is often insufficient.
The schemes create clear benefits. Workers can earn more abroad than they could at home, and remittances support families and local economies. Employers gain a more reliable labor supply. Origin countries gain income without requiring permanent emigration. Because participants often return home after a season or a work period, governments can present the programs as circular migration rather than one-way population loss.
However, circular migration still creates social costs. Workers may spend months away from spouses, children and older relatives. Communities can lose working-age adults during important periods. Reports about poor housing, excessive deductions and weak oversight have also raised concerns about exploitation. Seasonal labor programs work best when worker protection is treated as part of the migration system, not as an afterthought.
Refugees, Asylum and Protection
Refugee and asylum issues are smaller in Oceania than in Europe or Northern America, but they remain politically important. Australia has long combined humanitarian resettlement with strict maritime border policies. Its offshore processing arrangements in Nauru and Papua New Guinea became internationally controversial because of prolonged detention, mental health harms and uncertainty for asylum seekers.
New Zealand has a smaller refugee program and has generally been less central to global asylum controversies. Still, both countries face the broader question of how wealthy destination states should share protection responsibilities. In a region where climate risk is high and some island states fear long-term habitability pressures, protection debates may become more complicated over time.
It is important to keep categories clear. People displaced by a cyclone inside Fiji or Vanuatu are not automatically refugees under international law. People who move because livelihoods are eroded by sea-level rise or repeated disasters may not fit ordinary asylum categories either. That legal gap matters because climate-related mobility can be real even when it does not match the refugee definition.
Climate, Disasters and Mobility
Oceania is highly exposed to environmental hazards. Cyclones, volcanic eruptions, floods, droughts, coastal erosion and sea-level rise can all affect mobility. Some displacement is short-term, as people leave damaged homes and later return. Other movement becomes longer-term when land, water, infrastructure or livelihoods are repeatedly damaged.
Small island states face a particular problem. Relocation can threaten cultural identity, land rights and political sovereignty. Moving a household is difficult; moving a village is harder; preserving a nation’s legal and cultural continuity under severe climate pressure is harder still. That is why Pacific leaders often resist language that treats migration as the main answer to climate change. Many want adaptation finance, coastal protection and development support so people can remain where they live.
At the same time, planned mobility may be necessary in some cases. Labor pathways, education access and diaspora networks can help families diversify risk before a disaster makes movement urgent. For Pacific island communities, migration policy and climate policy increasingly overlap. The question is whether movement happens with rights, preparation and community consent, or under emergency pressure after homes and livelihoods have already been damaged.
A further issue is the timing of movement. Migration in Oceania is often discussed as permanent settlement in Australia or New Zealand, but many movements are temporary, circular or repeated. A student may first arrive on a study visa, work after graduation and later apply for residence. A Pacific worker may spend several seasons abroad without leaving the home country permanently. A family may move after a disaster and later return if housing and services recover. These patterns make the region harder to describe with a single statistic. The migrant-stock figure shows where people live at one point in time; it does not show all the back-and-forth movement that connects families and labor markets across the Pacific.
The Main Picture
Oceania’s migration profile is shaped by a sharp regional contrast. Australia and New Zealand are major destination countries with high migrant shares, strong universities and formal labor systems. Pacific island countries often rely on outward mobility, remittances and seasonal work to support households and national economies. These two sides are connected. The prosperity of many Pacific families depends on access to Australia and New Zealand, while employers in those countries depend on Pacific labor.
The current data update the old pandemic picture. The region is no longer defined mainly by closed borders. Australia’s migration surge has moderated, New Zealand’s net gain has fallen sharply from its post-pandemic peak, and the 2024 UN data show that Oceania’s migrant share remains among the highest in the world. Oceania is a small region by population, but migration is one of the main forces organizing its labor markets, family networks and climate risks.
The policy challenge is to avoid treating these issues separately. Student migration, skilled visas, Pacific labor schemes, remittances, refugee protection and climate mobility all interact. If Australia and New Zealand tighten pathways too abruptly, Pacific households may lose income and employers may lose workers. If pathways expand without housing, oversight and worker protection, migrants may carry the costs. A better system would treat mobility as a long-term regional relationship rather than a short-term fix for labor shortages.