Convention on Biological Diversity

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is the 1992 treaty that anchors the main international regime for biodiversity. It opened for signature at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. It entered into force on 29 December 1993 and now has 196 parties according to the CBD Secretariat’s official list. The United States signed the convention and remains outside it as a non-ratifying state. That absence matters in a regime governing biological resources, genetic technologies, environmental finance and traditional knowledge.

The convention begins from a practical definition of biodiversity. Biodiversity covers variation within genes and species, the functioning of ecosystems and the human uses that depend on them. That scope makes the CBD a treaty about territorial governance, research economies and technology transfer at the same time.

Summary

• The CBD has three objectives: conserving biological diversity, using its components sustainably, and sharing fairly and equitably the benefits arising from genetic resources.
• The treaty recognizes state sovereignty over biological resources and requires cooperation, national implementation, and prevention of transboundary environmental harm.
• The Cartagena Protocol regulates biosafety for living modified organisms; the Nagoya Protocol details access to genetic resources and benefit sharing.
• The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, adopted at COP15, translated the regime into four 2050 goals and 23 targets for 2030, including the conservation of 30% of terrestrial, inland water, coastal, and marine areas.
• Current disputes focus on finance, technology, digital sequence information, Indigenous peoples and local communities, and the distribution of costs between developed countries and megadiverse developing countries.

Origins and Scope of the Convention

The process that produced the CBD began before the Rio conference. In 1988, the United Nations Environment Programme created an expert group to examine the need for an international instrument on biological diversity. In 1991, that work became an intergovernmental negotiating committee. The text was adopted in Nairobi in May 1992 and opened for signature in Rio a few weeks later. The CBD emerged from the same diplomatic setting that produced the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which helps explain why sustainable development became its common language.

The treaty links conservation and development through a rule of responsible sovereignty. It recognizes that states have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources according to their environmental policies, and it adds a responsibility: activities under national jurisdiction or control must not damage the environment of other states or areas beyond national jurisdiction. That formula protects the sovereignty of biodiversity-rich countries and prevents sovereignty from becoming a license to export environmental harm.

This tension runs through almost every CBD negotiation. Developed countries often emphasize conservation targets and transparency. Megadiverse developing countries frame the same agenda around means of implementation: finance, technology and benefit sharing. The convention works as a forum for turning that bargain into legal routines, national plans and periodic COP decisions.

The Three Objectives of the CBD

The first objective is the conservation of biological diversity. Under this heading, the convention supports protected areas and species protection. The same objective covers ecosystem restoration and control of invasive alien species. Governments then have to carry biodiversity rules into production systems and urban planning. Conservation under the CBD depends on spatial planning, scientific monitoring and national institutions able to apply rules in real places.

The second objective is the sustainable use of the components of biodiversity. This dimension keeps the CBD connected to economies that depend on living systems. Sustainable use allows production, research and management when use preserves the ecological base that makes those activities possible. In countries such as Brazil, that question links forest policy with Indigenous and traditional territories, public research and bioeconomy debates.

The third objective is the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources. This pillar responds to a historical asymmetry. Tropical countries and local communities often hold the biological material and associated knowledge. Firms and laboratories in industrialized countries often hold the capacity to transform them into patents or products. The CBD allows research and commercial use within a negotiated relationship. Access must be linked to consent, mutually agreed terms and benefits that can strengthen the country or community of origin.

Institutions and Operation

The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the central decision-making body of the CBD. It normally meets every two years. It adopts decisions, reviews implementation and adjusts targets through work programmes. When the parties to the protocols meet, the COP serves as the meeting of the parties to those instruments: CP-MOP for Cartagena and NP-MOP for Nagoya. This structure keeps biosafety, genetic-resource access and conservation within the same institutional family.

The COP is supported by subsidiary bodies. The Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA) reviews technical questions before they reach ministers. The Subsidiary Body on Implementation (SBI) examines how states turn commitments into policy and reporting. COP16 created a permanent subsidiary body for Indigenous peoples and local communities. That institutional change gives Article 8(j) a steadier home inside the regime’s ordinary work.

The CBD Secretariat is hosted by UNEP and based in Montreal. It prepares meetings, supports governments and maintains the information platforms that make comparison possible. A permanent secretariat allows the convention to operate between COPs. Without that technical work, national strategies would depend on occasional diplomatic negotiations.

Cartagena, Nagoya, and Liability for Damage

The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was adopted in 2000 and entered into force in 2003. It governs cross-border movement and use of living modified organisms that may affect biodiversity, with human-health risks part of the assessment. Its central diplomatic point is precaution: when scientific uncertainty about possible harm is real, states may act before damage is proven and irreversible.

In practice, Cartagena created procedures through which importing countries receive information about living modified organisms and decide whether to permit their entry. This matters for countries with unequal regulatory capacity. A state with fewer laboratories, inspectors, or biotechnology specialists needs information and procedure before it assumes environmental or health costs.

The Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol was adopted in 2010 and has been in force since 2018. It complements Cartagena by addressing liability and redress for damage from living modified organisms. Its role is narrow and important: it turns biosafety into a response framework when damage occurs or is likely to occur.

The Nagoya Protocol was adopted in 2010 and entered into force in 2014. It develops the CBD’s third objective by creating the ABS framework for access and benefit sharing. Access should follow prior informed consent and mutually agreed terms when national law requires them. Benefits may be financial, scientific or institutional. The point is to make research value return to the origin country or community.

For megadiverse countries, Nagoya seeks to reduce biopiracy and give lawful research more certainty. Unclear rules hurt both sides of the exchange. States and communities of origin may receive no benefits. Researchers and firms may lack confidence about the legality of collection, sequencing or commercialization. The protocol tries to turn an unequal relationship into a negotiated procedure.

Biodiversity, Trade, and Intellectual Property

Benefit sharing reaches international trade as well. In World Trade Organization debates, biodiversity-rich countries have argued that the TRIPS Agreement should require patent applicants to disclose the origin of genetic resources and traditional knowledge used in inventions. The logic is direct: a patent based on biological material should allow origin, consent and benefit sharing to be checked.

This point explains why the CBD reaches trade, research and patents. Biodiversity can become commercial value through pharmaceuticals, seeds, industrial inputs or genetic data. When that value moves without rules on origin and sharing, countries and communities that conserve biodiversity help finance innovation elsewhere without proportional return. Overly bureaucratic rules can harm public research and conservation. The balance between access, control and benefit is the regime’s political core.

Kunming-Montreal and the 2030 Targets

COP15 adopted the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework in December 2022. The framework succeeded the Aichi Biodiversity Targets and set four goals for 2050 and 23 targets for 2030. Its better-known targets include ecosystem restoration and the conservation goal known as “30 by 30”. The package addresses harmful incentives and finance. The framework turned the CBD into a measurable implementation agenda for this decade.

The framework strengthened national biodiversity strategies and action plans. That requirement moves the CBD from declarations to administration. Each party must convert global targets into national priorities, indicators and budget choices. Implementation capacity varies sharply. A biodiversity-rich country may still face weak environmental agencies, land conflict and poor ecological data.

The “30 by 30” target illustrates the problem. Conserving 30% of land and sea by 2030 can expand protection. The effect depends on location, governance and local rights. A paper park protects less than a well-connected territory with finance and monitoring. For teachers, this is the easiest example of why an international target still needs domestic institutions.

COP16, the Cali Fund, and Digital Sequence Information

COP16 met in Cali, Colombia, in 2024 under the motto “Peace with Nature”. It resumed in Rome in February 2025 to close pending items. The meeting showed both progress and limits: participation rules advanced, and the DSI benefit-sharing mechanism moved from debate toward operation. Parties recognized the contribution of people of African descent to conservation.

DSI refers to digitized genetic information stored in databases and used across the bioeconomy. The political difficulty is that the Nagoya Protocol was designed mainly around physical genetic resources. Current science allows firms to use digital sequences without returning to the territory where the organism originated. For megadiverse countries and traditional communities, this can drain benefit sharing of much of its effect: the biological resource still has an origin, yet its value circulates as data.

The Cali Fund responds to that gap. The CBD decision provides that companies commercially benefiting from DSI should contribute, on a voluntary basis, 1% of profits or 0.1% of revenue to the mechanism. At least half of the resources should support Indigenous peoples and local communities. The design still needs implementation rules, yet the fund already shows that benefit sharing has moved beyond physical access to samples.

Brazil and Megadiverse Countries

Brazil is central to the CBD as a country combining exceptional biodiversity with the world’s largest continuous tropical forest. Indigenous and traditional communities hold knowledge tied to natural resources. This position gives Brazil a direct interest in finance, technology and DSI governance. At the same time, it creates pressure: Brazilian diplomatic credibility depends on reducing deforestation, protecting territories and turning biodiversity into sustainable development.

Since 2002, Brazil has participated in the Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries group, which brings together developing states with major biological wealth. The group seeks coordination on finance, technology transfer and benefit sharing. A common agenda has to be negotiated among different economic profiles. Megadiverse diplomacy works best when it turns that diversity of interests into a common demand for means of implementation.

Brazil’s position connects the CBD to other regimes. The Amazon Cooperation Treaty concerns sovereignty and regional cooperation in a space decisive for biodiversity. The 2030 Agenda treats biodiversity as part of development policy. The international climate regime intersects with the CBD where carbon reservoirs are living ecosystems.

Limits of the Regime

The CBD is legally binding. Its strength still depends on national implementation, finance and diplomatic pressure. The convention works through national obligations, reporting and legitimacy standards. It influences governments instead of commanding them directly. These mechanisms can change national policy. They still need budgets, enforcement, courts, public science and local participation.

Finance remains the most sensitive dispute. The Kunming-Montreal Framework calls for US$200 billion per year by 2030 and larger international flows to developing countries. Developing countries argue that conserving globally valuable biodiversity requires predictable resources and more balanced governance. Developed countries tend to prefer arrangements through existing funds, private-sector participation, and stronger transparency on results. The financing dispute defines who pays to conserve resources that benefit the whole planet.

Measurement is another limit. Biodiversity is harder to monitor than carbon emissions. No single indicator captures living systems. A country can expand protected areas and still lose species. It can reduce deforestation in one region and degrade ecosystems elsewhere. The CBD addresses this through indicators, national reports and scientific assessments. Data quality remains uneven, which makes implementation harder to compare across countries.

What the CBD Reveals

The CBD shows that international biodiversity politics is a struggle over living systems, territory, science and economic value. It protects species and ecosystems. It regulates access to genetic resources, profits from biological innovation and participation in decisions about traditional knowledge. That is why the convention brings state diplomacy, science, Indigenous representation, business interests and finance into the same process.

The biodiversity regime advances when global targets become national institutions, accessible finance and territorial protection. It fails when conservation stays on paper or when local communities are treated as passive beneficiaries. It fails again when genetic data generate value without benefit sharing. The CBD provides the legal and diplomatic language through which states negotiate who should conserve biodiversity, under what conditions and with which shared benefits.